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Abbreviations$of$Works$by$Husserl$CN! “On!the!Concept!of!Number:!Psychological!Analyses”!LI! Logical-Investigations!(Translation!of!Logische Untersuchungen, by J.N. 
Findlay); I will use LI 1 and LI 2 to refer to volumes 1 and 2, respectively, 
of the Findlay edition. 
PA Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations  
PS “Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic” 


















































































































































response!to!a!review!of!Philosophy-of-Arithmetic!that!Frege!wrote!in!1894.6!This!position!also!incorporates!the!idea!that!Husserl’s!early!views!are!those!that!come!under!attack!in!the!Prolegomena,!or!it!at!least!supposes!that!the!views!expressed!in!the!Prolegomena!come!about!because!of!a!turn!away!from!those!early!views.!That!there!seems!to!be!a!mismatch!between!the!early!views!and!the!succeeding!arguments!against!psychologism!only!makes!the!centrality!of!Frege’s!influence!less!plausible.!Furthermore,!Willard!and!Mohanty!provide!additional!convincing!reasons!for!rejecting!this!idea.!Without!rehearsing!those!arguments!here,!I!will!simply!remark!that!the!strongest!arguments!they!offer!are!built!on!textual!evidence!that!the!changes!in!Husserl’s!thought!can!be!dated!to!a!various!moments!in!time!preceding!the!review.7!The!1891!review!of!Schroder,!for!example,!already!contains!the!idea!of!pure!logic!as!defined!by!ideal!objective!meanings.!In!the!face!of!the!comparatively!paltry!evidence!in!support!of!Frege’s!influence,!this!makes!it!unlikely!that!his!review!was!the!source!of!Husserl’s!turn!from!psychologism!in!the!Prolegomena.8!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!See:!Follesdal!1958,!Hanna!2008,!Anderson!2005,!and!Kusch!1995.!7!Follesdal!1958!also!asks!the!question,!at what point between 1891 and 1896 does 
Husserl change his views? According to Follesdal, Husserl’s papers up to 1894 
still exhibit an adherence or appeal to psychology for the clarification of the 
foundations of logic. Frege’s review of PA appears in 1894 and Follesdal 




























































































logical statements made by logicians are in some sense about and applicable to 
particular events in the lives of particular people, they do not “draw their 
evidence” from the examination of those events. The paradoxicality, Willard 
says, is this: “how can claims about a certain sort of thing fail to draw their 
evidence from the examination of such events?” See Willard, 1972.!
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propositions.!Finally,!there!are!the!objectivities!that!expressions!and!meanings!are!about.!!! Meanings!themselves!are!ideal.13!They!relate!to!acts!of!meaning!as!the!ideal!content!of!real!acts.!It!is!only!the!acts!that!are!real.!Meanings!or!propositions!have!no!spatio\temporal!existence.!Rather,!they!are!what!stays!constant!across!variations!of!acts!of!meaning.!They!are!unchanging!entities,!not!created!by!acts!of!knowledge!but!there!for!our!discovery.!In!all!of!these!ways,!Husserl’s!conception!of!meaning!is!very!like!Frege’s!conception!of!senses!and!thoughts.!! Unlike!Frege,!Husserl!has!an!account!of!how!these!meanings!function!in!our!acts!of!thinking.!As!the!ideal!contents!of!meaning\intentions,!meanings!are!instantiated!in!individual!acts!of!meaning.!But!as!ideal!unities!that!“neither!spring!forth!nor!vanish!in!the!act!of![meaning]”!their!relation!to!acts!of!meaning!is!merely!contingent.!Husserl!explains!that!there!are!“countless”!meanings!that!are,!in!this!relational!sense,!merely!possible!since!they!are!never!instantiated!(LI,!233).!Thus,!a!meaning!retains!logical!independence!from!the!acts!in!which!it!is!instantiated.!In!this!sense,!an!ideal!meaning!is!one!member!of!an!ideal!set!of!logical!objects.!!! In!this!framework,!meanings!are!not,!however,!the!objects!of!acts.!Husserl!distinguishes!between!the!content!of!an!act!and!the!objectivity!to!which!it!makes!reference.!Though!meanings!are!in!some!sense!logical!objects!or!unities,!it!would!be!incorrect!to!think!of!them!as!the!objects!of!acts!of!meaning.!A!thought!is!not!about!its!meaning!but!about!some!object.!Meaning!is!instead!the!ideal!content!of!the!act!of!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13!See!sections!11,!12,!and!13!of!LI!1,!Chapter!1,!pp.!195\198.!
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